Fine's Monster Objection Defanged by Costa, Damiano et al.
1 
 
Fine’s Monster Objection Defanged 
Damiano Costa, Alessandro Cecconi, Claudio Calosi 
 
This is the final version of an article accepted for publication in Philosophical Quarterly. 
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Abstract. The Monster objection has been often considered one of the main reasons to explore non-
standard mereological views, such as hylomorphism. Still, it has been rarely discussed and then only in 
a cursory fashion. This paper fills this gap by offering the first thorough assessment of the objection. It 
argues that different metaphysical stances, such as presentism, three- and four-dimensionalism, provide 
different ways of undermining the objection. 
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1. Introduction 
Are composite objects mere sums of their parts? No, says the hylomorphist, who takes at least 
some of them to be structured wholes comprising both a material and a formal component. Yes, says 
the standard mereologist, who takes composite material objects to be unstructured 
mereological sums (Varzi and Cotnoir 2021, § 5.3). 
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After years of apparent oblivion, hylomorphism is firmly back on center stage of philosophical 
inquiry (Fine 1982; 1999; 2010; 2017; Johnston 2006; Koslicki 2008; 2018a; Koons 2014; Lowe 
2006; Marmodoro 2013; Marmodoro and Paoletti forth.; Rea 2011; Sattig 2015; forth.). While 
this revival of hylomorphism is nowadays justified by a battery of arguments and by the success 
of its applications (Fine 1999; 2010; Koslicki 2018b; Morganti forth.; Rea 1998; Sattig 2015), 
there is one remarkable argument, to which hylomorphists often appeal. It is said to be a fatal 
threat to standard mereology (Koslicki 2008), and one of the main reasons to adopt an 
alternative, hylomorphic, conception of material objects. It is, of course, Fine’s infamous 
Monster Objection (Fine 1999).1 
The objection, in a nutshell, is that standard mereology entails plain falsehoods, such as that a 
ham sandwich, say, exists before being assembled, or that mereological monsters such as the 
sum of Cleopatra and the ham are parts of the sandwich just as much as the ham itself is. 
Proponents of the objection take such falsehoods to be due to the insensitivity of standard 
mereology to structure. The ham-sandwich---so the thought goes---has a certain structure that 
imposes significant constraints: it prevents the sandwich from existing when its ingredients are not 
properly assembled and prevents it from having monsters-like objects as parts. Hylomorphism 
is explicitly designed to provide such sensitivity to structure and seems therefore equipped to 
escape the Monster Objection. 
Despite its importance, very little effort has been made to properly analyze and evaluate the 
effectiveness of the Monster Objection.2 This paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. It 
 
1 Or so is considered for example by (Koslicki 2008; Sattig 2015; Jacinto and Cotnoir 2019; Cotnoir and Varzi 
2021; Arlig 2005). Of course, there are other arguments in favour of hylomorphism, such as that from mereological 
coincidence (Fine 2003). It is a substantive question whether this argument applies only to ordinary material objects 
in some philosophical sense of the term (see e.g. Sattig 2015; Wachter and Ladyman 2019) or whether it has a 
broader scope. For instance, Fine thinks that it applies to molecules of water as well (Fine 1999: 74). 
2 Notable exceptions include Koslicki (2008) and Sattig (2015)---more on this later. 
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provides the first systematic analysis of the objection and its target. It also sets forth different 
responses to it that rely on established metaphysical views. The rest of the paper is structured 
as follows. We begin by identifying the polemical target of the Monster Objection (§ 2). We 
move on to our presentation of it and present four replies (§ 4). We conclude with an overview 
of our results (§ 5). 
 
2. What is ‘standard mereology’? 
The Monster Objection is an objection against ‘standard mereology’. 3  Fine himself 
characterizes it as follows: 
 
Thus, if I am right, it is only by abandoning our usual conception of material things 
as [i] relatively unstructured, [ii] completely unconceptual, and [iii] ontologically 
limited in their nature that we can attain a proper understanding of what they are 
(Fine 1999: 74). 
 




3 One might think that here ‘standard mereology’ simply stands for one of the axiomatic systems that are routinely 
assumed today, such as Classical Extensional Mereology (different axiomatizations of it are provided for example 
in Cotnoir and Varzi 2021). For reasons we explore below, this would be inaccurate. With ‘standard mereology’, 
Fine refers to a family of metaphysical views that share some elements to be discussed below. Note that Fine calls 
them ‘standard mereological conceptions’, in the plural (Fine 1999: 62). It is also clear, in context, that he doesn’t 




Fine constrasts “conceptual” with “physical” (69) and “material” (73) and equates it with 
“abstract” (69) and “intensional” (73).4 The latter terms are used in a hylomorphic context, to 
characterize the formal element of a material thing – an attribute or a function (73). Whether 
an object is unconceptual or not depends on the presence or absence of this formal element. 
Hence, something is completely unconceptual if and only if it has no attribute or function as a 
part or constitutive element (Fine 1999: 73). By contrast, a hylomorphic compound has an 
attribute or a function as a part or constitutive element – the form.5 This constitutive element 
is not supposed to be just a mere additional part, but to contribute in a distinctive way to the 
constitution of the object.6 
 
2.2 Unstructuredness (and Flatness) 
To spell out how standard mereological wholes are unstructured, Fine uses a set-theoretic 
analogy. 7 He writes: 
 
4 One might take here ‘intensional’ to contrast with the extensionality of proper parthood. We suspect that this is 
not the sense in which Fine takes it, insofar as the form of a hylomorphic compound is taken to be a part of the 
compound. 
5 Not all wholes that have an attribute or function as a part are hylomorphic compounds. A mere sum of some 
material components and an attribute would not do and would not constitute a significant departure from standard 
mereology. Better, we don’t take it to be a departure from standard mereology at all, in light of the fact that a mere 
sum containing an attribute is considered by Fine as one of the alternative ways in which a standard mereologist 
can conceive a material thing (Fine 1999: 63). In a hylomorphic compound, “the components and the relation do 
not come together as coequals, as in a regular mereological sum. Rather, the relation R preserves its predicative 
role and somehow serves to modify or qualify the components” (Fine 1999: 65). Unpacking this special role and 
its mereological character goes beyond the scope of this paper. 
6 It is a controversial matter among hylomorphists whether forms are to be intended as parts of objects or not. 
We prefer to remain neutral on this issue here and refer the reader to Johnston (2006) and Heil (forth.). 
7 We are indebted to Fine (2010: 571-4) and Cotnoir and Varzi (2021: § 5.3). 
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The wood is, as it were, a relatively unstructured version of the tree just as the set 
{a, b, c, d} is an unstructured counterpart of the set {{a, b}, {c, d}} (…) (Fine 
1999: 73). 
 
The analogy features two sets with the same ultimate components. The former is supposed to 
be the unstructured counterpart of the latter. Consider the structured set {{a, b}, {c, d}}. First, 
the set itself ---or, more precisely, its nature--- imposes a natural division among the ultimate 
components into two subsets. Second, it features a hierarchy of members and subsets. Both 
aspects are absent from the unstructured set.  The nature of the unstructured set imposes 
neither a natural division among ultimate elements, nor a hierarchy of subsets.8 Fine believes 
material things to be similar to the structured set and blames standard mereology for treating 
them as similar to the unstructured one. He writes: 
 
 
8 It is instructive to link this to two main set-theoretical notions, i.e. set membership and set inclusion. Set-
membership is sensitive to hierarchy and natural division, in that "most sets come with hierarchical structure of 
members, members of members, and so on" (Cotnoir and Varzi 2021: § 5.3). The hierarchy itself provides a natural 
decomposition of the whole, along the same lines. By contrast, set-theoretic inclusion is neither sensitive to 
hierarchy nor to any natural decomposition. The part-whole relations of standard mereology resemble set-
theoretic inclusion rather than set-theoretic membership. Cotnoir and Varzi (2021: § 5.3) recognize this explicitly. 
Fine himself seems to point to this fact in (1999: 72; 2010: § 2). One might protest that we linked standard 
mereology blindness to structure to two different aspects: the sum operation on the one hand, and the fact that it 
models part-whole relations in a way that resembles set-inclusion rather than set-membership on the other. The 
crucial point is that these two aspects are not independent. If one models parthood relations in a way that it is 
similar to set-inclusion, then one can show that sum---defined in terms of parthood---obeys both idempotence and 
associativity, thus being blind to hierarchy of levels and repetition. By contrast is one uses set-theoretic 




Of course, everyone can grant that some spatial divisions of an object are more 
natural than others. The division of a car down the middle, for example, is far less 
natural than the division into an engine, a chassis, and a body. But on the present 
view, the natural division is intrinsic to the identity of the object in a way that the 
other divisions are not (Fine 1999: 72). 
 
And about hierarchy he says: 
 
[..] the majority of material objects, on our account, will submit to a hierarchical 
division into parts. Just as a car will have an engine, a chassis, and a body as 
immediate parts (these being the components of the rigid embodiment that is the 
current manifestation of the car), these immediate parts will themselves have 
further immediate parts, and so on all the way down until we reach the most basic 
forms of matter. Thus a material object will be like a set, with its hierarchical 
division into members, members of members, and so on (Fine 1999: 72). 
 
The absence of hierarchy and natural division reflects the unstructuredness of standard 
mereology. To see where this unstruscturedness originates, we should take a closer look at the 
properties of standard mereological summation and, in particular, at associativity, 
commutativity and idempotence (see Fine 2010: 571-74). Associativity mandates that given two 
or more objects the resulting fusions are numerically identical to one another no matter which 
objects are summed first. This is easily appreciated in the context of Classical Extensional 
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Mereology (CEM) where "x"y"z ((x + y) + z) = (x + (y + z)) is a theorem.9 Commutativity 
mandates that the order in which the operation of sum is applied to objects does not impinge 
on the identity of the resulting whole. As an illustration consider CEM again:10 "x"y (x + y) = 
(y + x) is a theorem. Finally, let us consider idempotence. It mandates that the resulting whole 
remains numerically identical regardless of the number of times the parts are added together. 
In CEM  "x (x + x) = x is equivalent to the reflexivity axiom.11 These features of standard 
mereological summation make it the case that a hierarchy or a preferred division cannot be 
singled out.12 Thus, we may say that standard mereology yields relativitely unstructured objects 
in the relevant sense because its sum operator has all these three properties. It is in this sense 
that standard mereology is sometimes said by Fine to yield a flat conception of material objects. 
There is a sense in which flatness just is blindness to hierarchy and natural division (Fine 2010: 566). 




9 In effect it is a theorem of every system based on £, given the definition of sum and the underlying associativity 
of disjunction (Varzi and Cotnoir 2021: § 5.3). 
10 Again, this is true for any system where £ is taken as primitive, for it follows from the definition of sum and the 
associativity of disjunction (Varzi and Cotnoir 2021: § 5.3). 
11 And in systems that accept the equivalence between x £ y and x + y = y (Varzi and Cotnoir 2021: § 5.3). 
12 If sum is associative then the order in which objects are fused does not make a difference. Therefore, it is not 
possible to distinguish between immediate and mediate parts which is key to develop a hierarchy of parts and a 
natural division into parts (Fine 1999: 71-72).  
13 We defer to Cotnoir and Varzi (2021) for a further analysis of the structures to which standard mereology is 
blind, and to the analysis of this notion in Fine’s later works. The reader will have realized that we are here 
assuming that “ontologically limited in their nature” might refer here either to the absence of an intensional 
element or to the absence of a natural and hierarchical division into parts of such objects. In light of what we have 
said above, this means that this kind of limitation is adequately captured by our characterization of standard 
mereology. 
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2.3 Standard mereology and CEM 
We therefore take the target of the Monster Objection – standard mereology – to be any 
mereological theory according to which objects are relatively unstructured and completely 
unconceptual – in the senses specified above. A notable example of such a theory is CEM. 
However, it is crucial to realize that standard mereology is in fact a family of mereological 
theories – a family of “standard conceptions” as Fine (1999: 62) puts it – of which CEM is just 
a prominent member. If you consider the mereological theory that results from the removal of 
some axioms of CEM, such a mereological theory would still be an instance of standard 
mereology, as long as ‘its wholes’ remain relatively unstructured, completely unconceptual, and 
ontologically limited in their nature.14 For example, one axiom of CEM, that will turn out to be 
crucial later on, is unrestricted composition (roughly there is a mereological sum for any non-empty 
plurality of things). It should be clear that rejecting it does not entail going beyond standard 
mereology as we characterized it. This is because this rejection would impact the number of 
existing sums and not their nature; whenever there is a composite object, it will still be completely 
unconceptual and relatively unstructured. 
This interpretation of standard mereology partially contrasts with previous ones. For example, 
it contrasts with that of Koslicki, who takes the target of the Monster Objection to be exactly 
CEM (Koslicki 2008: 19-20), thus including unrestricted composition. Our interpretation also 
contrasts with that of Sattig (2015: 12). Sattig takes the target of the Monster Objection to be 
the standard Lewisian four-dimensional view of objects, namely a view that combines 
mereological elements – such as CEM, tenseless mereology and the claim that ordinary objects 
are mere sums of their parts – with metaphysical ones – such as perdurantism. Their reading 
 
14 Here, we do not offer an independent argument for the unconceptuality of CEM wholes. However, we take it 
to be a consequence of both its standard interpretation and its formal framework. For according to the former 
abstract entities are not taken to be parts. According to the latter, even if they were parts, there would be no 
distinctive way in which they contribute to the constitution of objects. Hence, they would not count as formal 
components. 
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does not come without textual support, but neither does ours, as shown above. Moreover, their 
reading makes the target of the Monster Objection – a rejection of CEM or of the Lewisian 
view of objects – much more limited than what we take it to be. 
In any case, after presenting our ways of deflecting the Monster Objection in § 4, we shall 
review them in § 5, and make it clear to what interpretation of standard mereology they are 
applicable – and some of them apply even if standard mereology is taken to be CEM or the 
Lewisian view. 
 
3. The Monster Objection 
Consider a ham sandwich and the ingredients which make it up: two slices of bread and a piece 
of ham. What is the sandwich? And what is its relation to its ingredients?15 The bottom line of 
the Monster Objection is that, in answering those questions, standard mereology ends up 





15 In the original formulation, Fine begins with a different question: what is it for x to be part of y? However, Fine 
himself claims that the Monster Objection does not concern the nature of parthood only, but, more generally, of 
parts and wholes and their relations. In his words, “We conclude that neither conception of mereological sum, as 
aggregate or compound, yields a satisfactory account of the ham sandwich or its parts” (Fine 1999: 64). 
16 The overall structure of Fine’s argument is as follows. Fine proposes four possible answers to the question, 
‘what is the sandwich?’, that a standard mereologist could give and argues them to be unsatisfactory. We shall call 
this encompassing argument the Monster Objection. Fine provides different arguments against each of these four 
answers. Some authors reserve the name ‘Monster Objection’ for the argument against Answer 3 (Koslicki 2008; 
Sattig 2015; Jacinto and Cotnoir 2019). Koslicki (2008: 72) calls the argument against Answer 1 the ‘Aggregative 
Objection’. In this paper, we are interested in Fine’s more general case against standard mereology and therefore 
discuss all four answers. 
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Answer 1  
(A1) The sandwich is a mereological sum of its ingredients17 
 
Fine argues that this answer delivers the wrong existence conditions for the sandwich. For a 
mereological sum exists at any time at which either (i) at least one, or (ii) all, of its parts exist.18 
Now, usually, all the ingredients of a sandwich exist before its assembly. And this implies that 
also the sandwich exists before being assembled, which is absurd.  
 
Answer 2 
Presumably, the sandwich fails to exist when the ingredients are scattered because they lack the 
proper arrangement. What if we add it to the sum, as a trope? Accordingly, 
 
(A2) The sandwich is a mereological sum of its ingredients and an arrangement-trope. 
 
Fine points out that the success of this proposal depends on our views about the spatiotemporal 
profile of tropes. Where and when a trope exists is no simple question, especially when it comes 
to relational tropes. And even if the proposal delivers the right existence conditions, “it is hard 
to believe that [the trope] is a part in the same way as the standard ingredients” (64). 
 
17 What is for x to be a mereological sum of the ys? Standard mereology gives several answers to this question. 
Here is one: x is a sum of the ys iff every y is part of x, and every part of x overlaps one of the ys. (Hovda 2009: 
6). Our analysis does not hinge on a particular definition of mereological sum. Moreover, Fine himself takes the 
operation of sum as primitive and defines parthood in terms of it. 
18 These are of course two exclusive options. Fine discusses two different notions of sums which obey the two 




Even if a mereological sum of all ingredients could exist before being assembled, it is a sandwich 
only for a limited amount of time. This suggests the following: 
 
(A3) The sandwich is a mereological sum of the restriction of the ingredients to the time t at 
which the sandwich exists.  
 
How to make sense of the restriction of an object to a time depends on our metaphysics. Four-
dimensionalists will presumably take the restriction to be a temporal part of the object. Three-
dimensionalists are less used to talk about temporal restrictions, but they are not left without 
options.19 (Anyway, if we can’t make sense of temporal restrictions in a suitable way, then A3 
will have to be rejected.20 This squares nicely with Fine’s aims.) 
 
19 There are at least three options at the three-dimensionalist’s disposal. One first possibility is to consider the 
restriction of an object at a time as a qua-object. That is, the restriction of x at t is x qua F, being F the property 
of existing at t. Another possible interpretation is to follow Gilmore (2006) and take the restriction of x at t as a 
temporal segment of x. Thus, the temporal restriction of x at t would be a y, such that y’s path is a proper subregion 
of x’s path and y shares all matter with x through its path (Gilmore 2006: 206). The last option that came to mind 
is to take temporal restriction as a function that takes an entity, x, and a time, t and gives back the entity itself. 
After all, a three-dimensional object is wholly present at each time of its persistence. (Of course one might also 
take an object to be a variable embodiment and its temporal restrictions to be rigid embodiments. But this would 
mean buying into a hylomorphic view and abandoning standard mereology.) This is by no means an exhaustive 
survey of the 3D accounts of temporal restriction, nor we take these interpretations to be unproblematic or 
uncontroversial (for example, the first option would alarmingly look similar to a variant of hylomorphism, while 
the third would arguably deliver the wrong existence conditions again). 
20 To illustrate, we mention here three worries about the notion of temporal restriction in this context. (i) The 
notion does not make sense at all (e.g. a 3D who is not persuaded by any of the proposed interpretations). (ii) The 
chosen interpretation delivers the wrong existence conditions for objects. (For example, this would be the case if 
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A3 might deliver the right existence conditions for the sandwich. However, it entails absurd 
mereological consequences. To see this, notice that the ham now enters the sandwich insofar 
as the sum which is the sandwich contains the restriction of the ham to t as one of its elements. This 
is the sense in which the ham can still be said to be a part of the sandwich. However, in that 
very sense, also other things which are not parts of the sandwich will turn out to be parts of it. 
Enter the monster, i.e., the mereological sum of the ham and Cleopatra. At the time t of the 
sandwich, what exists of the monster is nothing other than the ham. Hence, the restriction of 
the monster to t is nothing but the restriction of the ham to t. But the restriction of the ham to 
t is one of the elements of a sum to which the sandwich is identical. Therefore, the monster is 
going to be a part of the sandwich just as its ingredients are, which is absurd. 
 
Answer 4 
So far, we have worked with a timeless notion of parthood – x is part of y. Let us now try to 
work with a temporary notion of parthood – x is part of y at t. 21 In that case, all our mereological 
notions would have to be temporally qualified. And so should be the notion of mereological 
sum – y is a sum of the xs at time t. If so, the natural suggestion is: 
 
(A4) The sandwich is a mereological sum of its ingredients at time t. 
 
 
the last interpretation of a temporal restriction mentioned in the previous footnote is adopted. Indeed, in that case 
the restriction of the ingredients at any time will be nothing other than the ingredients themselves. Hence, a 
sandwich will end up existing before being properly assembled). (iii) The resulting account A3 would be circular, 
for in accounting of what the object is, it refers to a time, which in turn is identified by referring to the object itself 
(for t is the time of the object’s existence). 
21 On timeless vs temporary mereology, see e.g. Simons (1987), and Sider (2001). 
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A4 is (or at least looks) different from A3, insofar as (i) it does not make use of temporal 
restrictions, and insofar as (ii) its mereology is temporary and not timeless. However, A4 entails 
the same absurd mereological consequences of A3. To see this, notice that the piece of ham is 
now part of the sandwich in the sense that the ham is part of the sandwich at time t. However, as 
Fine notes, for x to be part of y at time t is for the restriction of x to t to be part (in the timeless 
sense) of the restriction of y to t. In other words, temporary parthood is defined in terms of 
timeless parthood. To illustrate, consider what this means in a four-dimensionalist setting: the 
ham is part of the sandwich at t insofar as the temporal part of the ham is part (timelessly) of 
the temporal part of the sandwich – which is correct (Sider 2001; Cotnoir and Varzi 2021). 
That considered, it should be clear why A4 entails the same absurd mereological consequences 
of A3. Consider the monster. We have already seen that the restriction of the monster to t is 
nothing other than the restriction of the ham to t. Hence, the monster is going to be a part of 
the sandwich just like the ham is – again. 
Standard mereology, Fine concludes, seems unable to account for the nature of the sandwich 
and for its relation to its ingredients, either because its answers deliver the wrong existence 
conditions for the sandwich (the sandwich could exist before being assembled), or because they 
entail absurd mereological consequences (the monster is part of the sandwich just like the ham 
is). This is of course a modus tollens against standard mereology. But it might also turn out to 
be a proper or improper part of an argument in favour of hylomorphism, insofar as –
hylomorphism alone is able to account for the nature of the sandwich. 
 
4. Taming the Monster 
In what follows, we shall discuss four replies to the Monster Objection (§ 4.1-4). All these 
replies rely on popular metaphysical theories, such as four-dimensionalism or presentism. 
14 
Adherents to these theories will find it natural to adopt the strategy that stems from their own 
view. Note that it is not our aim to defend a particular way out from the Monster Objection. 
We just want to offer a comprehensive (but not exhaustive) picture of the ways in which the 
objection can be resisted by remaining in the frame of standard mereology. This general picture 
is enough to motivate the claim that the Monster Objection is not, as Koslicki (2008: 75) puts 
it, “fatal for the standard conception of mereology as it applies to ordinary material objects”. 
 
4.1 The Four-dimensionalist Reply 
Four-dimensionalists will take Answer 3 on Fine’s list to be particularly appealing. For they take 
the sandwich to be a four-dimensional entity, composed by some of the temporal parts – the 
temporal restrictions – of its ingredients. However, according to the Monster Objection, a 
sandwich can’t be a sum of the restriction of its ingredients. For this option entails incorrect 
mereological consequences, such as that, crucially, the monster is part of the sandwich just like 
the ham. 
But is the ham part of the sandwich, in any privileged sense? The answer might seem obvious. 
But it is not obvious at all. Especially for the aforementioned four-dimensionalist. If four-
dimensionalism is true, the ham is a four-dimensional entity. Its later temporal parts contribute 
to form the sandwich. But it exists earlier than the sandwich. And hence some of its temporal 
parts exist before the sandwich. If you consider the ham – the whole four-dimensional ham – 
you will therefore realize that the ham overlaps the sandwich, for they have parts in common 
(the ham’s later temporal parts). But the ham is definitely not a part of the sandwich, for there 
is a part of the ham that extends outside – earlier – the sandwich and is not mereologically 
included in it. As four-dimensionalists never tire of saying, what is a part of the sandwich is not 








Figure 1. From a four-dimensionalist perspective, 
the ham (h, striped background) is not part of 
the sandwich (s, thick boundary), it merely overlaps it. 
 
From the four-dimensionalist point of view, the belief that the ham is part of the sandwich is 
not the result of reliable intuitions, but of a three-dimensionalist bias that should be rejected. 
Once this bias is exposed and rejected, the Monster Objection loses its bite. For it rested on 
the assumption that, in some sense, the ham is part of the sandwich and the monster isn’t. If 
four-dimensionalism is true, none of them is part of the sandwich. And none is mereologically 
related to the sandwich in a special and exclusive way: both of them have a part in common 
with the sandwich, and that’s it. Standard Mereology is not to blame for failing to account for 
a difference that is not there. We call this the Four-dimensionalist Reply to the Monster 
Objection.22 (One might object that claiming that the ham is not, strictly speaking, a part of the 
sandwich, offends irremediably against common sense, and is therefore a consequence that 
should be rejected at all costs. For reasons that will soon become obvious, we postpone the 
 
22 We remark that in principle this response might be given by anyone who rejects the intuition that the ham is 







discussion of this possible rejoinder to § 5. Suffice it to say that some of our replies below 
consist in the adoption of views that are usually considered to be as close common sense as 
one can be). 
 
4.2 The Temporary Mereology Reply 
The fourth answer considered by Fine consists in shifting from timeless – x < y – to temporary 
mereology – x <t y. On this view, the sandwich is the mereological sum of its ingredients at a 
given time: St (s,b1,b2,h). This fourth answer should be particularly appealing for a three-
dimensionalist, who tends to relativize instantiation to time for independent reasons, i.e., as a 
response to the problem of temporary intrinsics. According to Fine, this fourth answer has the 
same problematic consequences of the previous one: the monster is going to be part of the 
sandwich just like the ham is. To recall, under this proposal, the ham is part of the ham at a 
given time – h <t s. Moreover, temporary parthood is to be defined in terms of timeless parthood. 
That is, x is part of y at t iff the restriction of x at t is (timelessly) part of the restriction of y at 
t: x <t y := xt < yt . And if this definition is accepted, we have indeed a good reason to believe 
that the monster is part of the sandwich. For, as we noted earlier, the restriction of the monster 
at t is nothing but the restriction of the ham at t. So, the monster is part of the sandwich just 
like the ham is. 
Here, we would like to focus on the proposed definition of temporary part in terms of timeless 
part. The only reason that we have to conclude that the monster is part of the sandwich rests 
essentially upon this definition. Is the definition correct? Most four-dimensionalists would 
accept it. For they usually say that x is part of y at t iff the temporal part of x at t is (timelessly) 
part of the temporal part of y at t (Sider 2001: 57; Cotnoir and Varzi 2021: § 6.2). But some four-
dimensionalists might want to reject it. As explained by Sider (2001: 57), a four-dimensionalist 
17 
might have good reasons to prefer her mereology to be primitively temporary. Moreover, and 
more crucially, most three-dimensionalists would not accept the proposed definition. Instead, 
they would take their mereology to be primitively temporary, or at least irreducible to timeless 
mereology.23 This should not come as a surprise. For temporary parthood is a temporary 
attribute. And most three-dimensionalists take temporary attributions to be irreducible to 
timeless ones.24 
If mereology is taken to be irreducibly temporary, the definition of temporary part in terms of 
timeless part is to be rejected. Moreover, since the only reason we had to conclude that the 
monster is part of the sandwich rested essentially upon this definition, once this definition is 
gone, this reason disappears with it. There is no reason anymore to conclude that the monster 
is part of the sandwich at t. Or, if there is, it is still forthcoming, and the burden of proof now 
lies on the upholder of the Monster Objection. We call this the Temporary Mereology Reply 
to the Monster Objection.25 
Though we take the burden of proof to lie on our opponent’s side, we here sketch a reason for 
thinking that the monster cannot be a temporary part of the sandwich, at least if three-
dimensionalism is assumed. 26  The first step of our sketch consists in noting that Fine 
distinguishes two notions of sums acceptable within standard mereology, namely compounds and 
aggregates. These two notions correspond to the existence conditions outlined before. A 
 
23 Primitivists include Thomason (1983), Simons (1987: §5.2), Sider (1997; 2001), Hudson (2001), Bittner et al. 
(2004) (followed by Bittner and Donnelly 2007: Donnelly and Bittner 2009; Donnelly 2009; 2010), Masolo (2009), 
Giaretta and Spolaore (2011), and Hovda (2013: §1.2).  
24 Some solutions to the problem of temporary intrinsics temporalize the attribute itself. Exemplification there 
can be timeless. Still, the mereological predicates of timeless mereology are not thus temporally qualified. 
25 Sattig (2015: 4) remarks that three-dimensionalists usually would take temporary parthood as a primitive. 
However, later on, he does not discuss this as opening a possible way out of the Monster Objection. 
26 After all, if one is not a three-dimensionalist, we expect her to naturally lean towards the four-dimensionalist 
reply  in § 4.1. 
18 
compound exists at, and only at, those times at which all its parts exist, while an aggregate exists 
at, and only at, those times at which at least one of its parts exists. We expect a three-
dimensionalist to discard aggregates from her ontology. Indeed, Fine himself notices that 
aggregates are “spread out through time in much the same way as a material thing is ordinarily 
regarded as being spread out in space” (Fine 1999: 62), and this offends against the three-
dimensional claim that persisting objects are not spread out in time (Fine 2006: 699). So, we 
are left with compounds. We shall now argue that if a compound conception of sum is assumed, 
the Monster Objection does not get off the ground, for there will be no monster to begin with. 
Recall that a compound exists at, and only at, those times at which all its parts exist. This seems 
to correspond to the temporary version of the notion of sum in Simons (1987: 184, CDT16).27 
A compound c of a and b is defined as something that overlaps at t all and only those things 
that overlap at t either a or b, with both a and b existing at t.28 It should be clear that, given this 
definition, the monster, if thought of as a compound, does not exist at t because one of its 
elements, namely Cleopatra, does not exist at t.29 The desired consequence now follows, i.e. the 
monster is not a part at t of the sandwich. For, following Simons (1987), we take it that a 
 
27 Note that CTD16 in Simons (1987: 184) is not temporalized---in effect it is universally closed in the temporal 
variable. We have temporally modified it, following Simon’s own template in definition CTD15---which we take 
to be, roughly, the notion of sum corresponding to Fine’s notion of aggregate.  
28 Following Simons (2007: 184): c SMt ab = For every x, x overlaps c at t iff a exists at t and b exists at t and x 
overlaps at t either a or b.  
29 It is worth investigating whether a compound conception of mereological sums prevents by itself the existence 
of the monster and thus is enough to undermine the Monster Objection from the start. Our argument in the main 
text does not warrant this stronger conclusion because it takes parthood to be primitively temporary and is 
therefore silent as to whether a timeless mereology would deliver the same results. Much depends, we suggest, on 
the correct interpretation of the notion of existence at t which features in Fine’s definition of a compound. 
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minimal requirement for an object to be a part at t of another object is that they both exist at t. 
In effect, this is what axiom CTD8 in Simons (1987: 179) explicitly states.30  
It is worth noting here that not all three-dimensionalists would take their mereology to be 
temporary. We shall discuss two possible or actual examples. The first one concerns three-
dimensionalists who are also a presentists (e.g. Merricks 1999). Such three-dimensionalists 
might in general like to avoid temporalizing attributions to times and to have their attributes 
exemplified timelessly. The second example, which is probably the most relevant when it comes 
to the present context, concerns three-dimensionalists who are also fragmentalists. 
Fragmentalists might want to avoid temporalizing attributions to times and have their attributes 
exemplified timelessly – parthood included. 31  We take both such presentists and such 
fragmentalists to adopt one of our other strategies. Clearly, such presentists will adopt our 
Presentist Reply, given below (§ 4.3). As regards fragmentalists, we expect them to endorse 
some form of restricted composition (§ 4.4). In particular, we don’t expect them to believe in 
the existence of any fragment that contains the Monster – for it is a diachronic sum. In any 
case, we mention these two examples for the sake of completeness. Even though some three-
dimensionalists would not like their mereology to be primitively temporary, we still expect most 
of them to do.  
 
 
30 Here it is: if a is part of b at t, then a exists at t and b exists at t (Simons, 1987: 179). Note that even in the 
presence of this axiom, the requirement that both a and b exist at t for a compound c of a and b to exist at t is not 
redundant, for the definition of a compound in terms of overlap at t contains a disjunction---rather than a 
conjunction. 
31 We don’t take this to be the case of Fine, who we expect takes his facts to be tensed. Indeed, one should carefully 
distinguished timeless mereology -  x is part of y – from temporary mereology – x is part of y at t – and tensed mereology 




4.3 The Presentist Reply  
A sandwich can’t be a sum of the restrictions of its ingredients to a certain time. For this would 
entail that the monster – the sum of the ham and Cleopatra – is part of the sandwich just like 
the ham is. 
However, the monster can be part of the sandwich only if it exists in the first place. And if the 
monster exists, both the ham and Cleopatra must exist as well – for the existence of a sum 
entails that of its parts. Not only must they exist, they must also form a whole – the monster 
itself. 
Arguably, both these requirements for the Monster Objection, namely that 
(i) Both the ham and Cleopatra exist 
And that, if (i) is true, then 
(ii) There is a sum of the ham and Cleopatra, 
are controversial. Let us discuss each in turn. Here we focus on (i) and in the following 
subsection we focus on (ii). 
The first requirement entails the existence of Cleopatra. Now, Cleopatra is a past entity.  Hence, 
the Monster Objection should be a concern only for those philosophers who believe in the 
existence of past entities. To illustrate, a presentist, who does not believe in the existence of 
the past, would deny that Cleopatra exists. But if Cleopatra does not exist, neither does the 
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monster, and the Monster Objection does not get off the ground.32 We call this the Presentist 
Reply to the Monster Objection. 
 
4.4 The Restricted Composition Reply  
The second requirement for the Monster to exist is that there is a sum of the ham and Cleopatra. 
Even provided that both the ham and Cleopatra exist, it is definitely controversial that two 
entities that are apparently so divided in spacetime and unrelated to each other form a sum. 
Upholders of unrestricted composition will accept this, but all those who reject unrestricted 
composition with the aim of avoiding commitment to such sums would likely deny that there 
is a sum of the ham and Cleopatra. And if there isn’t such a sum, the Monster Objection does 
not get off the ground. We call this the Restricted Composition Reply to the Monster 
Objection. 
One might protest here. The aim of the Monster Objection is to challenge standard mereology, 
which is usually committed to unrestricted composition. We are here proposing as a way out 
the rejection of unrestricted composition. But if unrestricted composition is rejected, so is 
standard mereology and the Monster Objection has already achieved its goal. Our point is that 
this is not the case. Some popular mereological systems, such as CEM, are indeed committed 
to unrestricted composition. However, we argued that the target of the Monster Objection is 
not CEM. Rather, it is “standard mereology”, which is far weaker than CEM, and of which 
CEM is nothing but an instance. The Monster Objection also provides an indirect motivation 
for accepting hylomorphism. And one could reject unrestricted composition without 
 
32 Note that a spatial variant of the Monster Objection in which a gerrymandered sum of the ham and the Eiffel 
Tower, say, would not go through, for the temporal restriction of that monster to the time of the sandwich would 
not be identical to the ham. 
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committing oneself to hylomorphism – examples abound (McKenzie and Müller 2017; 
Petersen 2019; Simons 1987, Waechter and Ladyman 2019). 
Here we have introduced two ways of denying the existence of the monster. It is worth noticing 
that the two ways are independent from one another. If one rejects unrestricted composition, 
one could retain the existence of past entities. For example, one obvious way would be to 
require that a necessary---even if not sufficient---condition for composition is synchronicity: 
there are no diachronic fusions. And if one rejects the existence of past entities, one can 
arguably retain unrestricted composition, and even CEM, in its full strength. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have presented several replies to the Monster Objection. Each of them has its own 
individual strength. Are we perhaps in danger of losing sight of the forest for the trees? In order 
to reduce this risk, let us focus on the broader picture these replies suggest. We (i) present this 
picture, (ii) relate it to the different conceptions of standard mereology which we identified in 
§ 2, and (iii) discuss a final worry concerning commonsense. 
If all our strategies are considered together, one immediately sees that for any major 
metaphysical stance, there is a natural way out of the Monster Objection. Presentists are 
naturally led to adopt the Presentist Reply to the Monster Objection (§ 4.3). Arguably, non-
presentists who are three-dimensionalists will be naturally inclined to adopt the Temporary 
Mereology Reply (§ 4.2), while non-presentists who are four-dimensionalists will be inclined to 
adopt the Four-dimensionalist Reply (§ 4.1). Since we have taken into account both presentists 
and non-presentists, this seems to give a fairly exhaustive picture of the metaphysical landscape. 
Let us now turn to the second point of this conclusion. The Monster Objection is supposed to 
be an objection to standard mereology. In § 2, we suggested that standard mereology is a family 
of views according to which material objects are completely unconceptual and relatively 
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unstructured. However, we have also pointed out that not everyone agrees that this is the target 
of the Monster Objection. According to Kathrin Koslicki (2008), the target of the Monster 
Objection is one particular member of that family, namely CEM. According to Sattig (2015), 
the target of the Monster Objection is the standard Lewisian four-dimensional view of objects, 
namely a view that combines mereological elements – such as CEM, tenseless mereology and 
the claim that composite objects are mere sums of their parts – with metaphysical ones – such 
as perdurantism. 
If the first interpretation is adopted, then all the replies that we have presented apply to the 
Monster Objection. On the other hand, if Koslicki’s interpretation is adopted, all replies apply, 
except one, namely the Restricted Composition Reply. Clearly enough, that’s because Restricted 
Composition is at odds with CEM. Finally, if Sattig’s interpretation is adopted, the Temporary 
Mereology Reply has to be discarded as well. That is because the Lewisian view adopts a 
primitively tenseless mereology. 
Before concluding let us address one final worry. One might want to develop the claim that the 
Monster Objection is an argument to the effect that standard mereology does not allow us to 
preserve our commonsensical worldview, for it does not allow us to retain platitudes such as: 
a sandwich does not exist before its creation, or, the Monster is not part of the sandwich. Given 
this, one might take our replies to be illegitimate. We propose to save standard mereology at 
the cost of adopting counter-intuitive views such as four-dimensionalism. So, the objection 
goes, we have failed to defeat the Monster. 
While we agree that some of our replies might be taken by some to display a certain degree of 
counter-intuitiveness (i.e. the four-dimensionalist one), we also offered other ways out that 
build on views that are often described in the literature as being very close to common sense. 
Here are two examples. Presentism, for better or worse, is usually presented as the metaphysics 
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of time that is closer than its rivals to commonsense. And Restricted Composition is often said 
to be the commonsensical view in the metaphysics of composition.  
 
In the light of the above, it seems safe to conclude that we should not be afraid of the Monster. 
But it should not be forgotten either. In fact, it should be addressed thoroughly. And this is 
what the paper has attempted to do. Facing up to monsters is how we often come to grasp 
truths of the first water. Not every monstrous creature is a threat. Sometimes, a monster is a 
thing of beauty.33 
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